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The Impact of Internal Audit Function Quality  






This study investigates whether measures of internal audit function (IAF) quality and the 
IAF’s contribution to the financial statement audit affect audit delay. We conduct empirical tests 
using 292 observations from 216 firms that responded to the Institute of Internal Auditor’s 
Global Auditing Information Network survey. Results indicate that audit delay is decreasing in 
IAF quality, and that this decrease is primarily driven by the competence of the IAF and the 
quality of their fieldwork. Audit delay is also at least four days shorter when the IAF contributes 
to the external audit by independently performing relevant work, but not when IAF personnel 
directly assist the external auditor. We further examine factors that affect the external auditor’s 
decision to use IAF work. The likelihood that external auditors use independently performed IAF 
work is increasing in IAF quality, internal auditor availability, and audit committee 
effectiveness, and decreasing in external auditor availability. The likelihood that IAF personnel 
directly assist external auditors is decreasing in IAF quality and increasing in audit committee 
effectiveness. 
 




The Impact of Internal Audit Function Quality  





 This study investigates the internal audit function’s (IAF’s) role in the financial statement 
audit by examining whether measures of IAF quality and the IAF’s contribution to the financial 
statement audit affect audit delay. Audit delay, measured as the number of days between a firm’s 
fiscal yearend and the audit report date, generally captures the time required to complete 
fieldwork (Ashton et al. 1987). The auditing literature has long recognized the importance of 
audit delay research because audit delays affect the timeliness with which financial and audit 
information is publicly disclosed (Givoly and Palmon 1982). Current interest in audit delay 
stems from recent accelerations in reporting deadlines and the implementation of Section 404 of 
the Sarbannes-Oxley Act (SOX), which together require auditors to perform more work in less 
time (U.S. Congress 2002; Ettredge et al. 2006; Bronson et al. 2011; Lambert et al. 2011). 
Specific interest in the IAF arises from the implementation of SOX Sections 302 and 404, which 
have increased IAF responsibilities surrounding internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), 
and Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS 5), which facilitates external auditor reliance on the IAF (U.S. 
Congress 2002; PCAOB 2007a; Schneider 2009). The sizeable literature on audit delay 
determinants has examined factors associated with firm risk and the audit process, without 
consideration of the IAF.  
Audit failures of the early 2000s have raised concerns regarding the timeliness and 
reliability of accounting reports (Ettredge et al. 2006). Undue reporting delays compromise the 
SEC’s ideal of equal access to information among market participants (Hakansson 1977; 
Chambers and Penman 1984; Bamber et al. 1993; SEC 2002). Pursuant to Section 409 of SOX, a 
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2002 SEC ruling gradually shortened 10-K reporting deadlines for accelerated filers from 90 
days to 60 days over a three-year period (U.S. Congress 2002; SEC 2002).1 At the same time, 
SOX 404 significantly expanded attestation requirements and Auditing Standard No. 3 (AS 3) 
increased audit documentation requirements (PCAOB 2004a). Both preparers and auditors 
expressed concern over their ability to accurately compile and effectively audit the reports within 
the shorted time frame, especially given the expanded attestation requirements. Consistent with 
these concerns, Lambert et al. (2011) and Bronson et al. (2011) suggested that managers face a 
tradeoff between the accuracy of accounting information and the timeliness with which 
information is reported. In particular, Bronson et al. (2011) documented that SOX 404 and AS 3 
increased audit delay; yet, firms did not correspondingly alter the timing of preliminary earnings 
announcements (PEAs). Consequently, the number of firms that released earnings prior to the 
completion of the audit increased from 37 percent of accelerated filers in 2002 to 87 percent in 
2005, the first full fiscal year for which SOX 404 was effective. PEAs that preceded audit 
completion were more likely to be subsequently revised, suggesting lower earnings reliability.  
In response to auditors’ and preparers’ concerns regarding reporting deadlines and to 
facilitate efficient SOX 404 compliance, the PCAOB enacted AS 5, which instructs external 
auditors to give greater attention to entity-level controls in determining the nature and extent of 
testing and increases the instances in which external auditors can use the work of others 
                                                
 
1 An interim filing deadline of 75 days became effective for accelerated filers for reports released after December 
15, 2003, while the 60-day deadline was originally scheduled to become effective on December 15, 2004. In 
response to a multitude of opposing comments, the SEC twice postponed the effective date of the 60-day deadline 
(SEC 2004, 2005). In 2005, the SEC also limited firms subject to the deadline to “large” accelerated filers. In 2005, 
the SEC also limited firms subject to the deadline to “large” accelerated filers. Thus, there are now two classes of 
accelerated filers (SEC 2005). The term “accelerated filer” refers to firms with common equity public float greater 
than or equal to $75 million, but less than $700 million as of the last business day of the most recently completed 
second fiscal quarter; and, “large accelerated filer” refers to firms with common equity public float of $700 million 
or more. Only one class of accelerated filer existed during our sample time period; therefore, we use the term 




(PCAOB 2007a). The standard thereby implies an expanded role for internal auditing because 
the IAF can help management strengthen entity-level controls through consulting and assurance 
activities, and the IAF can perform work that external auditors can use to formulate their opinion 
(Gramling et al. 2004; Schneider 2009; Institute of Internal Auditors [IIA] 2011).2 Specifically, 
Statement on Auditing Standard 65 (SAS 65) stipulates that internal auditors may contribute to 
the financial statement audit by either working as assistants under the direct supervision of the 
external auditors or independently performing relevant work throughout the audit year on which 
the external auditors can rely (AICPA 1991). Given the potential tradeoff between the timeliness 
and reliability of disclosures and the increased opportunity for the IAF to affect the financial 
statement audit, it is important to investigate the IAF’s role in audit report timeliness and factors 
that influence this role.3   
We conduct our tests using data on 216 firms providing detailed responses to the IIA’s 
Global Auditing Information Network (GAIN) survey for the four-year period immediately prior 
to the implementation of SOX 404.4 Based on professional standards and following prior 
research, we use GAIN data to develop multiple measures of IAF quality and the IAF’s 
contribution to the financial statement audit (AICPA 1991; Prawitt et al. 2009; IIA 2011; Lin et 
al. 2011). Results indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in our comprehensive quality 
measure corresponds to a reduction in audit delay of approximately three-to-four days, and that 
this reduction is primarily driven by the competence of the internal audit staff and the quality of 
their fieldwork. Audit delay is also significantly shorter (4.7 to 8.2 days) when the IAF 
                                                
2 We cite IIA standards and guidance issued after the time period of our sample (2001-2003). However, prior 
standards and guidance in place during the time period of our sample similarly discuss consulting and assurance 
services as key IAF activities. 
 
3 The term “financial statement audit” is used to refer to both an audit of the financial statements and an audit of 
internal control over financial reporting that is integrated with an audit of the financial statements. 
 
4 Fiscal yearends range from December 31, 2000 to November 14, 2004.  
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contributes to the financial statement audit by independently performing relevant work, but not 
when the IAF works under the direction of the external auditor. Audit delay reductions of three-
to-eight days are economically relevant for our pre-SOX 404 sample, as accelerated filers 
released earnings an average of seven days prior to the audit’s completion during this time 
period. While data availability confines our analysis to the period prior to SOX 404’s 
implementation, we expect that the impact of IAF quality and contribution would be even larger 
in a sample of firms drawn from the current period. SOX 404 substantially increased the IAF’s 
potential to contribute to the financial reporting process (Gramling et al. 2004, 196), and both 
audit and client firms have had almost ten years to adjust audit processes to the meet the 
standard. 
We also provide evidence on factors that influence the IAF’s contribution to the financial 
statement audit. IAF quality is positively associated with the likelihood that external auditors use 
independently performed IAF work and negatively associated with the likelihood that they use 
the IAF as direct assistants, suggesting that lower quality internal auditors require direct 
supervision. Audit committee effectiveness is positively and significantly associated with both 
methods of contribution, consistent with the premise that effective audit committees reduce 
control risk. The likelihood that external auditors rely upon independently performed IAF work 
is increasing in IAF availability and decreasing in the availability of external audit resources.  
This study makes several important contributions to the auditing literature. First, while 
research finds significant control problems are associated with longer audit delays (Kinney and 
McDaniel 1993; Ettredge et al. 2006), this is the first study to consider the effect of the IAF on 
audit delays. Second, our results suggest that external auditors behave in accordance with the 
audit risk model, i.e., they reduce audit effort, as measured by audit delay, in response to 
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reductions in control risk arising from greater IAF quality. Prior research finds mixed support for 
the audit risk model with respect to control risk (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Stein et al. 1994; and Felix 
et al. 2001; Hogan and Wilkins 2008). Third, this study extends prior research that investigates 
the impact of IAF contribution on external audit fees and hours (Stein et al. 1994; Felix et al. 
2001 and Prawitt et al. 2011). Audit fees and hours measure only external auditor effort, while 
audit delay encompasses both external and internal auditor effort. Fourth, this study contributes 
to the literature that examines auditors’ reliance decision by using actual, archival measures of 
IAF quality, audit committee effectiveness, misstatement risk, and auditor availability to identify 
factors that influence different methods of IAF contribution. Finally, we build upon prior studies 
that use GAIN data to document associations between IAF quality and both earnings quality and 
the prevention and detection of material weaknesses (Prawitt et al. 2009, Lin et al. 2011). 
Together, these studies suggest that the IAF affects the quality of reported earnings and both the 
effectiveness and timeliness of the reporting process.  
This research should be of interest to preparers, auditors, standard-setters, and regulators. 
The results suggest that managers can reduce audit delays by increasing IAF quality and 
structuring the IAF so that it can help the external auditor to complete the financial statement 
audit. Reducing audit delays from their current levels back to their pre-SOX 404 timing could 
potentially reverse the decline in the reliability of PEAs reported by Bronson et al. (2011).5 In 
2010, 93 percent of accelerated filers released earnings early, with the PEA predating audit 
completion by an average (median) of 15.7 (13) days. Moreover, evidence on the benefits of the 
IAF helps managers and auditors fully understand the potential risks associated with reducing the 
IAF during tough economic times. Such evidence is particularly timely given a 2008 PCAOB 
practice alert warning auditors that poor economic conditions may prompt firms to reduce 
                                                
5 Median audit delays for accelerated filers increased from 43 days in 2002 to 68 days in 2005.   
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personnel charged with internal control-related duties (PCAOB 2008). The results should also be 
of interest to regulators, who set reporting deadlines, and the PCAOB, who provides professional 
guidance for using the work of others in financial statement audits. 
Section 2 reviews the audit delay literature and presents hypotheses; Section 3 describes 
the research design. Results are discussed in Section 4, with concluding remarks in Section 5.  
2.  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1. The influence of IAF quality and contribution on audit delay 
 
2.1.1 Background on audit delay  
 
A large literature investigates potential determinants of audit delay. Much of this research 
focuses on the content of earnings disclosures, firm characteristics, and external auditor 
characteristics. Firm characteristics investigated include size, industry, fiscal yearend, and 
various proxies for complexity (e.g., Givoly and Palmon 1982; Ashton et al. 1989; Newton and 
Ashton 1989; Bamber et al. 1993). External auditor characteristics investigated include audit 
technology, audit staffing, audit work timing, hourly fees, auditor changes, and designation as a 
“Big N” auditor (Ashton et al. 1989; Newton and Ashton 1989; Bamber et al. 1993; Schwartz 
and Soo 1996; Knechel and Payne 2001; Leventis et al. 2005; Ettredge et al. 2006).  
Only three studies address the strength of a firm’s internal control system, which is a key 
determinant of the total amount of work required for the external audit. Ashton et al. (1987) 
measured internal control quality using external auditors’ perceptions; they found that internal 
control quality was negatively and significantly associated with audit delay in their subsample of 
381 non-public U.S. firms, but not in their subsample of 107 public firms. Kinney and McDaniel 
(1993) used misstatements in the quarterly earnings reports of 85 firms as a joint proxy for 
internal control quality, yearend audit effort, and auditor/client discussions. They found that 
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audit delay for restating firms was 17 days longer than that of matched firms without such 
corrections, and the change in delay from the prior year was eight days longer. They concluded 
that while internal control quality was a contributing factor to audit delay, not all of the 
substantial delay could be attributed to quality. Some of the delay was likely due to the existence 
of the accounting error, per se, as it required the external auditor to expand audit scope and it 
increased time devoted to internal-external auditor negotiations. Ettredge et al. (2006) measured 
the strength of ICFR using material weaknesses reported under Section 404 of SOX and found 
that firms reporting a material weakness experienced significantly longer delays (16 days) than 
those with effective ICFR. Again, part of this delay was likely driven by increased external 
auditor-client negotiations regarding the material weakness. Together these studies provide 
useful evidence on the relation between internal control quality and audit delay. We extend this 
line of research by considering a critical determinant of internal control quality, the internal audit 
function. Managers and audit committee directors set IAF attributes and activities. Accordingly, 
the IAF provides managers and directors with a way to improve the accuracy of preliminary 
earnings numbers if IAF attributes and actions can reduce audit delay.   
The internal audit function (IAF) can influence external audit activities in two ways. 
First, the IAF is part of a firm’s control environment and hence affects control risk. Statement of 
Audited Standards (SAS) No. 65 specifically mandates that external auditors consider the IAF 
when assessing a firm’s control environment (AICPA 1991, Section 322.04). External auditors’ 
assessment of control risk determines the nature and amount of substantive audit procedures 
required to achieve an acceptable level of overall audit risk (AICPA, 1983). Second, external 
auditors can rely on work performed by internal auditors, either independently or under their 
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direction, in completing the financial statement audit (AICPA 1991, Sections 322.24-27; 
PCAOB 2004, 2007a).  
2.1.2. IAF quality 
Management, and not the IAF, is responsible for maintaining ICFR; however, the IAF 
can support management in this endeavor as long as the IAF remains objective (IIA 2004, 3). 
The IIA has long advocated that management consult with the IAF on various control related 
issues in addition to relying on the IAF to provide assurance services (IIA 2011). In its role as 
consultant, the IAF can assess relevant risks and advise management in designing and 
implementing controls throughout the reporting process. In its traditional assurance role, the IAF 
reviews and tests the effectiveness of controls. IIA guidance pertaining to SOX 302 specifically 
advocates that the IAF conduct assurance activities to support management assertions as to the 
adequacy of ICFR (IIA 2004). If control problems are identified, internal auditing should assess 
management’s plans for correcting them and perform follow-up reviews. Finally, the IAF is 
charged with ensuring that the results of ongoing internal audit activities are communicated to 
appropriate parties, including the audit committee and the external auditors.  
Although practitioners and academics alike have long recognized that the IAF can affect 
internal control quality, only recently have researchers begun to provide direct empirical 
evidence of this relation. Using firms in the GAIN database, Prawitt et al. (2009) found a 
positive relation between a comprehensive measure of IAF quality and earnings quality, as 
measured by accruals. Lin et al. (2011) also used the GAIN database to investigate IAF quality. 
Their results suggest that certain IAF activities (use of quality assurance techniques, audits of 
financial reporting activities, and follow-up monitoring) help prevent material weaknesses in 
ICFR from occurring, while other activities improve SOX compliance processes. To the extent 
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that a higher quality IAF results in improved ICFR, and correspondingly lower control risk, it 
follows from the audit risk model that external audit effort should be negatively associated with 
IAF quality. This premise is consistent with Simunic (1980) who modeled internal and external 
auditing as diminishingly substitutable resources in preventing misstatements. The assumption 
that less external audit effort results in fewer audit days leads to the following hypothesis:6 
H1: Audit delay is negatively associated with IAF quality.  
 
2.1.3. IAF contribution to the financial statement audit 
External auditing standards have consistently acknowledged internal auditing as a 
potentially valuable resource in the financial statement audit (SAS 65, AICPA 1991; AS 2, 
PCAOB 2004; AS 5, PCAOB 2007a). These standards allow external auditors to rely on relevant 
work performed independently by the IAF or under the direction of the external auditors 
(hereafter referred to as independently performed IAF work and direct assistance, respectively), 
as long as the IAF is deemed to be of acceptable quality. Reliance on work performed by the IAF 
can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the external audit (Schneider 2009). According 
to the PCAOB (2005, 11), “an auditor who appropriately uses the work of others enhances the 
overall efficiency of the audit.” In both of its inspection reports on SOX 404 compliance, the 
PCAOB cites external auditors’ failure to use the work of others as a cause of inefficiency 
(PCAOB 2005, 2007b). As part of a comprehensive effort to make SOX 404 compliance more 
efficient, the PCAOB increased the opportunity for external auditors to rely on the IAF by 
                                                
6 A lower level of effort will not result in fewer audit days if the external auditors decide to reduce the amount of 
resources allocated to the audit on a daily basis instead of maintaining the same effort level per day and reducing the 
number of days. Similarly, lower effort levels will not result in fewer audit days if external auditors instead choose 
to allocate more time to high-risk areas or expand the scope of the audit. Such allocations would bias our tests 
against finding results that support the hypothesis. To address reallocations of external auditor time, we control for 
external audit fees. 
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permitting auditors to use the work of others as principal evidence (Fogelman et al. 2007; 
PCAOB 2007a; Woodlock 2007).7   
Few empirical studies have directly tested relations between external audit effort and the 
extent to which the external auditor uses IAF work.8 Using survey data from 108 audits in the 
financial services industry, Stein et al. (1994) measured contribution with a dichotomous survey 
question and external auditor effort with hours and fees. Contrary to their predictions, 
contribution was positively associated with hours and not associated with audit fees. In a study of 
70 firms, Felix et al. (2001) measured contribution using external auditors’ perceptions of the 
percentage of the external audit completed by the IAF. Consistent with their predictions, they 
found that external audit fees were decreasing in IAF contribution. Using GAIN data on 235 
firms, Prawitt et al. (2010) measured IAF contribution with the percentage of IAF time devoted 
to providing “external audit assistance,” and “auditing annual accounts, financial statements and 
reports.” The audit assistance measure, a proxy for for direct assistance, was significantly (p < 
0.05, one-tailed) and negatively associated with audit fees. The second question, which measured 
external auditors’ reliance on independently performed IAF work, was not significantly 
associated with audit fees.  
The two later studies suggest that when external auditors use work performed by the IAF, 
there is a corresponding reduction in external audit resources required to complete the financial 
statement audit, and hence, a reduction in audit fees.  Audit delay provides a useful 
complementary proxy to audit fees because it reflects both internal and external audit resource 
                                                
7 Under AS 2, external auditors were only permitted to use the work of others to supplement evidence they had 
obtained firsthand (PCAOB 2004). 
 
8 Several studies have indirectly measured IAF contribution to the external audit using proxies such as internal 
control expenditures, internal audit payroll costs, and the number of internal auditors (Chung and Lindsay 1988; Gist 
1992; Raman and Wilson 1992; Anderson and Zeghal 1994; Gerrard et al. 1994; Adams et al. 1997; Goodwin-




consumption; and, it is not subject to measurement error arising from “low balling,” cross-
subsidization, and other pricing policies (O’Keefe et al. 1994). Moreover, some managers may 
value a reduction in audit delay more than a reduction in fees. Given that the IAF can provide 
additional resources that the external auditor can use to complete the financial statement audit, 
we expect that reliance on the IAF should reduce the number of days required to complete the 
audit, as stated in H2. 
H2: Audit delays for firms whose external auditors use work performed by the IAF, either 
independently or under the direction of the IAF, are shorter than those for firms whose 
external auditors do not use IAF work.  
 
2.2.  Determinants of IAF contribution 
 
Given the potential for IAF contribution to reduce both audit delays and fees and the 
increased opportunity for external auditors to use IAF work under AS 5, it is important to 
understand factors affecting external auditors’ decisions to rely on the IAF. Auditing standards 
and prior research suggest that IAF contribution is determined by IAF quality, audit committee 
effectiveness, misstatement risk, and audit resource availability. Several experiments have 
investigated whether, and how, external auditors incorporate different aspects of IAF quality 
(competence, objectivity, and fieldwork) into their reliance decisions (see Gramling et al. 2004 
for a review); yet, there is relatively little archival evidence on the external auditor’s reliance 
decision. Felix et al. (2001) is the only archival study of which we are aware that proposes and 
tests a comprehensive model of IAF contribution. Accordingly, we build upon their important 
research and use a larger, more recent, and more comprehensive dataset to overcome some of the 
data limitations of their analysis of 66 firms. A key advantage of our data set is that it combines 
objective survey questions with data from publicly available sources. For example, we formulate 
a multi-dimensional measure of quality based on average years of IAF audit experience, 
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percentage of IAF staff with audit certifications, chief audit executive (CAE) reporting lines, and 
other objective measures; and, measures of internal and external auditor availability are 
exogenously determined by the timing of the financial statement audit. Felix et al. (2001) relied 
solely on external auditors’ perceptions of IAF contribution and its determinants to test their 
hypotheses. We also expand upon Felix et al.’s (2001) analysis by modeling different forms of 
IAF contribution (direct assistance and independently-performed work) and investigating the 
direct effects of external auditor availability and factors associated with misstatement risk.     
2.2.1. IAF Quality 
External auditors can only rely on work performed by the IAF if the IAF is deemed to be 
of sufficient quality. IAF quality is determined by the competence and objectivity of IAF 
personnel, together with the effectiveness of their fieldwork (SAS 65 AICPA 1991; AS 5, 
PCAOB 2007a). The more highly competent and objective the IAF, and the more thorough their 
fieldwork, the more the external auditor can rely on worked performed by the IAF. Prior 
experimental research has found positive relations between IAF quality and auditors’ decisions 
to rely on internal auditors’ work (Abdel-khalik et al. 1983, Maletta 1993, and Maletta and Kida 
1993). Felix et al. (2001) identified a significantly positive association between external auditors’ 
perceptions of IAF quality and the IAF’s contribution to the external audit. Consistent with prior 
research, we expect that IAF contribution will be increasing in IAF quality, as stated in H3a.  
 H3a: The likelihood that external auditors use work performed by the IAF to complete 
the financial statement audit is positively associated with IAF quality. 
 
2.2.2. Misstatement risk 
Few academic studies have addressed the impact of risk factors on auditors’ reliance 
decisions. Experimental research indicates that risk affects the extent to which different aspects 
of IAF quality (objectivity, competence, work performed) influence the reliance decision, and 
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that auditors employ more complex interactive decision processes to evaluate internal auditors 
when inherent risk is greater (Maletta and Kida 1993, Maletta 1993). Felix et al. (2001) found 
that as inherent risk increased, auditors moved away from simple decision criteria (such as IAF 
availability) and toward more analytical decision functions. Glover et al. (2008) reported that 
external auditors’ tendency to rely more on work performed by an outsourced internal auditor as 
compared with an in-house internal auditor was increasing in the level of inherent risk. While the 
aforementioned studies clearly demonstrate that risk is an important consideration in the reliance 
decision, they do not measure the direct impact of risk on the reliance decision.  
Material misstatement risk is the likelihood that a material misstatement exists and a 
firm’s control system will not detect the misstatement. SAS 65 instructs auditors to assess the 
risk of material misstatements when deciding whether to rely on the IAF (AICPA 1991). 
Evidence obtained through an auditor’s direct personal knowledge is generally more persuasive 
than information obtained indirectly (AICPA 1991, Section 322.18) and the responsibility for the 
opinion rests solely with external auditor. Accordingly, as misstatement risk increases, the need 
for the external auditor to perform his or her own tests of assertions increases (AICPA 1991, 
Section 322.20). While the external auditor still considers IAF work in high-risk conditions, the 
IAF’s work alone cannot reduce audit risk to a level that eliminates the necessity for external 
auditors to perform their own tests. Financial restatements provide an “explicit acknowledgement 
of material omission or misstatement in prior financial statements” (Abbott et al. 2004).  
Accordingly, H3c predicts a negative relation between restatements and IAF contribution.  
H3c:  The likelihood that external auditors use work performed by the IAF to complete 
the financial statement audit is negatively associated with restatements. 
 
2.2.3 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
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The audit committee is responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process. A more 
effective audit committee has been found to reduce the occurrence of restatements and fraud 
(Kinney and McDaniel 1989, Abbott et al. 2000, Abbott et al. 2004). Audit committee 
effectiveness is captured by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) recommendations, which 
address audit committee member independence, financial literacy, and expertise; audit 
committee size and authority over the appointment of the external auditor; and disclosures 
regarding audit committee charters and communications with shareholders and external auditors 
(Abbott et al. 2004).  For example, the objectivity of the IAF is strengthened when the IAF 
reports to an audit committee that does not include a former or current member of management 
(Rahundandan et al. 2001); and a certain level of financial acumen is necessary to understand the 
complex accounting issues that arise in compiling the financial statements. An effective audit 
committee can help lower the risk of a material misstatement, which in turn, increases the 
opportunity for the external auditor rely on the internal auditor, as stated in H3d. 
H3d: The likelihood that external auditors use work performed by the IAF to complete 
the financial statement audit is positively associated with audit committee effectiveness. 
 
2.2.4. External and internal auditor availability 
 The availability of both external and internal auditing resources is an important 
consideration in determining the nature and extent of the IAF’s role in the financial statement 
audit. When all of the audit firm’s personnel are fully employed, as is generally case during the 
“busy” season, firms have a strong economic incentive to rely on the IAF. Using IAF work 
during this period potentially enables external auditors to serve more clients and/or reduce 
overtime expense.9 In contrast, during slack periods, substituting internal audit work for external 
                                                
9 We assume that the use of the IAF is not accompanied by a fee decrease that exceeds the marginal revenue earned 
by assigning external auditors to other clients or the external audit firm’s marginal cost of performing the work with 
its own staff. 
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audit work potentially reduces revenues without reducing professional labor costs. Thus, we 
expect that the external auditor will be less likely to rely on the IAF outside of the “busy” season. 
 Just as resource constraints affect external auditors’ demand for IAF resources, IAF 
resource constraints affect client firms’ willingness to contribute IAF personnel to the financial 
statement audit. The more time the IAF has available after fulfilling a firm’s internal auditing 
requirements, the greater the potential for the IAF to contribute to the external audit. Consistent 
with this premise, Felix et al. (2001) found that external auditors’ perceptions of IAF availability 
were significantly and positively associated with perceptions of IAF contribution. However, it is 
quite possible that client firm managers simultaneously choose the extent to which the IAF 
contributed to the external audit and the amount of IAF resources that would be available to 
assist external auditors, and Felix et al. (2001) did not address simultaneity. Our research design 
overcomes this limitation by investigating the impact of an exogenous reduction in IAF 
availability arising from the implementation of SOX 302, which substantially increased firms’ 
internal control attestation requirements, and correspondingly, firms’ demand for internal audit 
work. Thus, we expect that firms’ internal audit functions had less time available to assist 
external auditors with the financial statement audit after SOX 302’s implementation than prior to 
implementation. The previous discussion on auditor availability leads to H3d:  
H3d:  The likelihood that external auditors use work performed by the IAF to complete 
the financial statement audit is lower outside of the “busy” season and lower in the 
periods after the implementation of SOX 302.    
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
Data for this study come from multiple sources. We use firm-level data collected by the 
IIA through their 2003 and 2004 GAIN surveys. The GAIN database consists of chief audit 




executives’ (CAEs’) responses to a comprehensive survey designed to measure various aspects 
of an organization’s internal audit activities.10 Next, we collect firm financial data from 
COMPUSTAT and audit fee and restatement data from Audit Analytics. Our initial sample 
contained 1,356 responses from 935 GAIN survey respondents pertaining to fiscal years 2000 
through 2004. We then eliminate ten observations for fiscal years ending on or after November 
15th, 2004, the effective date of SOX 404. Since firm names are not reported in the survey data, 
we employ a matching algorithm to identify firms based on reported SIC code, total assets, 
revenues, and number of employees.11 We eliminate 1,026 observations that could not be 
matched with COMPUSTAT data, 18 observations with missing GAIN data, and nine 
observations missing data for audit delay or control variables. The resulting sample contains 293 
firm-year observations from 223 firms with fiscal years ending on or after December 31st, 2000, 
and prior to November 15th, 2004 (Table 1, Panel A).12  
Panel B of Table 1 depicts the breakdown of the sample by year and regulatory regime. 
Recognizing that the impending implementation of SOX 404 potentially affects our hypothesized 
relationships, we perform the analyses on both the full sample of 293 observations and a subset 
of 189 observations that predate SOX 404’s implementation by at least 22 months. We expect 
that SOX 404’s impending implementation will have relatively little effect on the hypothesized 
relations for this portion of the sample. Also, each of the 189 observations in the subsample 
                                                
10 The data were subject to various validation checks, including validation measures built into the questionnaire and 
manual procedures and reasonableness tests applied after the data had been collected. The GAIN database covers a 
wide range of institutions including publicly traded companies, private companies, educational institutions, divisions 
within companies, and governmental institutions. More information can be found at the GAIN web site: 
http://www.theiia.org/guidance/benchmarking/gain/.  
 
11 Prawitt et al. (2009) and Lin et al. (2011) also employed this matching algorithm. 
 
12 We eliminate firms with missing values for IASize, Experience, Education, and Certifications, and set missing 
values to zero for Fieldwork QA and Financial Focus. There are no missing values for IA Contribution. Eliminating 
all firm-year observations with missing values for any IAF variables produces materially similar results. 
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comes from a different firm, alleviating concerns regarding the independence of observations 
from the same firm. We control for SOX 302’s implementation with an indicator variable rather 
than partitioning the sample because there are not enough observations from the pre-SOX 302 
period to test the hypotheses for this portion of the sample. Moreover, while SOX 302 clearly 
increased management’s and the IAF’s internal control responsibilities, the passage of SOX 404 
had a much larger impact. In particular, Bronson et al. (2011, Table 2) reported that audit delay 
increased by less than one day from 2001 to 2002, the year in which SOX 302 was implemented 
as compared with a 12-day increase from 2003 to 2004, the year in which SOX 404 became 
effective.  Ettredge et al. (2006) tested how audit delay differed between the pre-404 and post-
404 periods for the same firms and found that the first year implementation of SOX 404 was 
associated with 34-day increase in audit delay. They concluded that the increase in audit delay 
was due to Section 404 itself, and not SOX in its entirety (Ettredge et al. 2006, p 3). 
3.2 Determinants of audit delay 
To test H1 and H2, we model audit delay as a function of the quality of the IAF, the 
IAF’s contribution to the financial statement audit, and a set of control variables (Equation 1),    
Delay =  β0 + β1IAF Quality + β2IAF Contribution  
+ µ1Financial Ind +µ2Utility + µ3Size + µ4Segments  + µ5ROA 
+µ6Leverage + µ7Loss +µ8Extra + µ9Restate  + µ10AFee 
+ µ11EA Tenure + µ12NotBusy + µ13AC Effectiveness  
+ µ14Post302_02 + µ15Post302_03 + ε 
 
(Eq. 1) 
Delay is the number of days between a firm’s fiscal year-end and the date of the audit report.13 
IAF Quality represents either a single comprehensive measure of quality (IA Quality), or a set of 
five variables that capture different individual aspects of quality (Competence, Objectivity, 
                                                
13 The two largest observations for audit delay exceeded the mean by 8.3 and 4.5 standard deviations, respectively. 
These observations were winsorized to the 99th percentile to prevent extreme observations from biasing the results. 




Fieldwork Qual, Financial Focus, and IA Size). IAF Contribution is either a single dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the auditor uses the work of the IAF to complete the financial 
statement audit (IA Contribution), or two dichotomous variables indicating the form of IAF 
contribution (DirectAssit or IndepWork ). Variables are discussed below and defined in Table 2.   
3.2.1 Measures of IAF quality 
Professional standards and prior research suggest that measures of IAF quality 
encompass competence, objectivity, fieldwork quality, fieldwork scope, and investment in 
internal auditing (AICPA 1991, Gramling et al. 2004; Prawitt et al. 2009, IIA 2009, Lin et al. 
2011).  Prawitt et al. (2009) were the first to use the GAIN data to develop a comprehensive 
measure of IAF quality. Building on Prawitt et al. (2009), Lin et al. (2011) focused on measuring 
the individual components that make up IAF quality, including competence, objectivity, 
fieldwork quality, audit scope, and investment in the IAF. We draw on Prawitt et al. (2009) and 
Lin et al. (2011) in selecting one or more GAIN survey items to develop proxies for each 
component of quality, as well as a single composite quality measure. Where possible, we test the 
validity of our measures by correlating them with relevant GAIN survey questions.  
Five components of IAF quality 
 The competence of internal auditing personnel is calculated from four variables, 
Experience, Education, Certification, and Training (SAS 65, AICPA 1991; Prawitt et al. 2009; 
Lin et al. 2011) (See Appendix A for descriptive statistics). Experience is the average number of 
years of internal and external auditing experience of the audit staff; Education is the average 
number of years of undergraduate and graduate education; Certification is the percentage of 
professional staff members with one or more audit certifications; and Training is the average 
annual hours of training per staff member. As these variables are measured on different scales, 
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we first standardize each variable to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Competence is measured by the average of these four standardized variables, and re-centered to 
be a continuous positive variable.14 We weight the individual standardized variables equally in 
computing Competence because the extent literature gives little direction on the relative 
importance of experience, certification, training, and education in assessing competence. For 
example, Messier and Schnieder’s (1988) results indicated that experience was the most 
important factor, while Gramling and Myers (1997) found that CIA designation was important. 
Brown (1983) reported that IAF training programs, professional certification, and CPE were key 
criteria. Lin et al. (2011) found that education level was negatively and significantly associated 
with the likelihood that a firm reported a material weakness.15  
 In their summary of the internal auditing literature, Gramling et al. (2004) found that 
external auditors used the reporting relationship for the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) most often 
to evaluate IAF objectivity. Following Prawitt et al. (2009), Messier et al. (2011), and Prawitt et 
al. (2011, 2012), we measure IAF objectivity with an indicator variable, Objectivity, that equals 
one if the CAE functionally reports to the audit committee.16 
                                                
14 An alternate method of combining variables measured on different scales is to convert them to dichotomous 
variables by assigning a value of one to those observations that equal or exceed the median, and 0 to those that do 
not, and then computing the average. However, information is lost in dichotomizing continuous variables. For 
example, the median for Experience is 8 years, thus the dichotomous measure would treat an IAF with an average 
experience level of 8 years to be the same as an IAF with an average experience level of 4 years, but different from 
one with an average experience level of 8.5 years. In robustness tests, Competence was measured by dichotomizing 
the variables to combine them, and the significance level for Competence was the same. 
!
15 To help validate the Competence measure, we use Messier et al.’s (2011) finding that IAFs that serve as 
management training grounds are of lower quality than those that consider internal auditing to be a career position.  
Consistent with their results, mean and median values of Competence are significantly lower for firms that use the 
IAF is as a management training ground.  
  
16 Lin et al. (2010) used the amount of control-related information the CAE reviews with the audit committee to 
measure objectivity. We do not use Lin et al.’s measure because more meetings between the CAE and audit 
committee may be indicative of internal control problems, which would lead to an increase in audit delay. To help 
validate this measure, we correlated it with a survey question asking respondents whether the CAE meets privately 
with the audit committee and found that for 90 percent of all observations, CAEs that report to the audit committee 
also meet privately with the audit committee.  
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 Early studies used the following criteria to evaluate the quality of IAF work performance: 
management’s overall support of the IAF (Clark, et al. 1980), external auditor’s satisfaction with 
previous IAF work, supervision of IAF work, follow-up procedures, and IAF scope (Clark et al. 
1980; Brown et al. 1983; and Messier and Schneider 1988). Consistent with this, Lin et al. 
(2011) found that firms reported fewer material weaknesses when their IAF’s used more quality 
assurance techniques (including supervision) and followed up on previously-identified control 
problems. They also found evidence that the IAF practice of issuing grades in audit reports, a 
practice promoted by IIA guidance, helped identify control problems (IIA 2009, 2011).17 
Following Lin et al. (2011), fieldwork quality (Fieldwork Qual) is constructed from four 
survey questions pertaining to the use of quality assurance practices, one question on follow-up 
procedures, and one on grading (See Appendix A for questions and descriptive statistics). These 
are the only survey items that directly relate to fieldwork quality. Questions addresing quality 
assurance practices have three-point response scales (never, sometimes, always) for each of four 
different practices (direct supervision, independent working paper review, audit client feedback, 
and peer review), thus, responses “never”, “sometimes”, and “always” are coded as zero, one, 
and two, respectively. The questions for follow-up procedures and grading use two-point 
response scales (no, yes); responses “no” and “yes” are coded as zero and two, respectively.18 
We acknowledge that combining the six survey questions (four quality assurance practices, one 
follow-up question, one grading question) requires subjectivity; however, the extant literature 
provides little direction regarding the manner in which these items should be weighted. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
17 A grade is a succinct means of documenting and conveying an opinion on the risk posed for a specific area or 
system and the IIA provides specific guidance on the practice of grading (IIA 2009). Grading requires the IAF to 
establish standards and a methodology to support their assessments. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) considers it to 
be a best practice.  
 
18 Coding “yes” as 1 does not materially affect results.   
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Moreover, calculating measures from multiple survey items reduces the error associated with any 
single item.  
 Messier and Schneider (1988) found that the most important aspect of fieldwork was the 
extent to which financial reporting activities were included in the scope of IAF fieldwork. The 
scope of IAF fieldwork is distinct from the quality of fieldwork because it is possible that the 
IAF can perform low quality audits of many activities related to financial reporting. Accordingly, 
we measure fieldwork scope with a separate variable. Following Lin et al. (2011), the extent to 
which IAF activities are relevant to the financial statement audit, Financial Focus, is an average 
of five survey questions that rate the frequency with which the IAF audits financial activities 
(adequacy of internal accounting controls; accuracy, reliability, and completeness of financial 
records; impact of changes in accounting rules or regulations; externally-reported interim 
financial results) and compliance with GAAP (See Appendix A for questions and descriptive 
statistics). We choose these survey items because they directly address activities that are relevant 
to the financial statement audit. Prawitt et al. (2009) and Prawitt et. al. (2012) measured 
fieldwork scope with a survey question that asks respondents to record the percentage of audit 
staff time devoted to “Financial - auditing annual accounts, financial statements and reports” and 
denoted, TimeFin. As in Lin et al. (2011), we do not use this question to measure scope because 
the response rate (71 percent) is significantly lower than response rates for other relevant GAIN 
questions (98-99 percent) in the COMPUSTAT-matched sample. Furthermore, analysis of 
TimeFin and Financial Focus suggests that they both measure similar underlying constructs.19  
                                                
 
19 The correlation of the two variables is 0.42 (p < 0.001, two-tailed). Mean values for TimeFin by response category 
(never, occasionally, regularly) for four of the five items used to construct Financial Focus increase significantly (p 




Finally, investment in the IAF, IA Size, is calculated by taking the natural log of total IAF 
annual operating costs scaled by total assets (Lin et al. 2011). We use a logarithmic 
transformation because the ratio of IAF costs to total assets is highly skewed and the 
untransformed variable is highly correlated with a key control variable, external audit fees, used 
in tests of the hypotheses.20 
Comprehensive measure of quality 
We combine the five individual components of IAF quality into a single, comprehensive, 
continuous measure of IAF quality (IA Quality). One challenge to combining the five variables is 
that Objectivity is dichotomous and the remaining variables are continuous. To combine them, 
we standardize the four continuous variables so that each has a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of one. We assign Objectivity a value of negative one if the CAE does not report to 
audit committee; and one if the CAE does. Thus, having a CAE that does not report to the Audit 
Committee corresponds to being one standard deviation below the mean on the scales for the 
other variables. We combine the five variables by taking a simple average of them and adding a 
constant so that all values are positive.21  
We weight each of the five components of quality equally because the literature provides 
little guidance on this subject. Experimental studies assessing the relative importance of 
competence, fieldwork, and objectivity suggest that the quality of work performance is of 
                                                
20 Following Prawitt et al. (2009), an industry-adjusted measure of size was also computed. In untabulated tests, the 
industry-adjusted measure yields materially similar results as our primary measure when used to compute the 
comprehensive quality measure (Equation 1). However, the industry-adjusted measure is not significantly associated 
audit delay when included as a separate variable in the regression model.  
 
21 We also combine the five variables by dichotomizing the four continuous variables based upon whether an 
observation is above below the median. These variables are added to Objectivity to produce an ordinal measure of 
quality ranging form 0 to 6. Significance levels using the dichotomous approach are highly consistent with the 
standardized approach. We use the standardized approach in the main tests because information is lost when 




greatest importance (Gramling et al. 2004, p 210). Consistent with this, Lin et al. (2011) found 
measures of fieldwork quality and scope to be significantly associated with the existence and/or 
detection of material weaknesses. However, Prawitt et al. (2009), who were the first to develop a 
comprehensive IAF quality measure, gave the greatest weight to competence.22 
3.2.3 IAF Contribution measures 
Following Lin et al. (2011), we measure the IAF’s contribution to the financial statement 
audit with a survey item that asks respondents whether the IAF coordinates audit services with 
the external auditors. Respondents who affirm that coordination takes place are then asked to 
specify the method(s) of coordination from the following list (multiple methods are permitted): 
(1) loan staff to external auditors, (2) perform complete or partial audit of specific locations, 
products or functions, (3) conduct joint planning sessions, and (4) conduct joint risk or control 
sessions. Sections 322.23 – 27 of SAS 65 discuss methods of internal-external audit coordination 
and thus provide guidance for coding this question into variables (AICPA 1991). Coordination 
methods (1) and (2) refer to IAF audit work that contributes to the completion of the financial 
statement audit, while coordination methods (3) and (4) are practices used to plan and monitor 
the audit. Accordingly, the variable, IA Contribution, equals one if the IAF uses coordination 
methods (1) or (2) (192 observations). Conversely, if the IAF only coordinates with the external 
auditors through meetings (methods (3) and/or (4), 75 observations), or the IAF does not 
coordinate at all with the external auditors (26 observations), IA Contribution equals to zero.23 
                                                
22 Prawitt et al. (2009) equally-weighted three different components of competence (Experience, Certifications, and 
Training), one measure of objectivity, one measure of scope, and one measure of investment. In robustness tests, we 
used this approach and the coefficient on this quality measure dropped slightly in one-tailed significance from 0.01 
to 0.05 when compared to the measure presented in Table 5 for tests of H1.  
 
23 SAS 65 (Section 322.23), “Coordination of the Audit Work With Internal Auditors,” describes practices that 
external auditors commonly use to identify risks, plan the audit, and monitor progress, including, “holding periodic 
meetings, scheduling audit work, providing access to internal auditors’ working papers, reviewing audit reports, and 
discussing possible accounting and auditing issues” (AICPA, 1991). Accordingly, we assume that coordination 
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Appendix B contains the exact wording of the survey question and shows how responses are 
coded.   
We further investigate whether either of the first two practices individually affects audit 
delay by creating separate indicator variables for them. According to Section 322.27 of SAS 65,  
“Using Internal Auditors to Provide Direct Assistance to the Auditor,” direct assistance relates to 
work the external auditor “specifically requests the internal auditors to perform to complete some 
aspect of the (external) auditor’s work” (AICPA 1991). External auditors are required to 
supervise, review, evaluate and test such work. We interpret coordination method (1) “Loan staff 
to External Auditors” as providing direct assistance to the external auditor, and set the variable 
DirectAssist equal to one if the IAF loans staff to the external auditor, and zero otherwise. SAS 
65 Sections 322.24-322.26, “Evaluating and Testing the Effectiveness of Internal Auditors’ 
Work,” provide guidance for evaluating independently performed IAF work that will 
significantly affect the nature, timing and extent of the EA procedures (AICPA 1991). 
Coordination method (2) “Perform complete or partial audits of specific Locations, Products, or 
Functions” corresponds to these sections of the standard; and, we set the variable, IndepWork, 
equal to one if the IAF uses this method of coordination; and zero, otherwise. We acknowledge 
that IAF audits of specific locations, products or functions could be performed under the 
direction of the external auditor; however, this coordination method was presented as an option 
distinct from “loan staff to external auditor.” Thus respondents likely chose method (1), “loan 
staff”, to indicate that staff worked under the direction of the external auditor and method (2), 
                                                                                                                                                       
methods (3) and (4) (conducting joint planning and joint risk or control sessions) address this type of internal-
external auditor coordination and that the external auditor did not rely on IAF work if methods (3) and (4) were the 




“perform complete, …”, to indicate that the IAF performed work on which the external auditor 
relied, but did not work as direct assistants. 
 The survey question we use to measure IAF contribution method differs from that used 
by Prawitt et al. (2011) and Messier et al. (2011). They used a survey question that asks 
respondents to allocate IAF staff time across 15 different activities. Two of these activities, time 
devoted to “external audit assistance” and “auditing annual accounts, financial statements and 
reports,” were used as proxies for direct assistance (TimeEA) and independently performed work 
(TimeF), respectively. We did not use TimeEA and TimeF in our main tests for two reasons. 
First, the question used to form these variables does not directly enquire about different methods 
of internal-external coordination, rather it asks about the relative amount of time IAF staff devote 
to various activities. It is not clear whether respondents interpreted time devoted to “external 
audit assistance” as only referring to direct assistance and not referring to all forms of external 
auditor assistance. Conversely, it seems that the practice of loaning IAF staff to the external 
auditor could only be interpreted as providing direct assistance. Second, the response rate for the 
time allocation question (71%) was significantly (p < 0.001, two-tailed) lower than the response 
rates for other relevant GAIN questions (98-99%) in the COMPUSTAT-matched sample. This 
suggests that respondents may not have understood the question or that they did not have the data 
to accurately answer the question.   
  In un-tabulated tests, we compared mean and median values of TimeEA for different 
methods of IAF contribution. Mean and median values for TimeEA were significantly higher (p < 
0.001, two-tailed) for IAFs that only loan staff (mean = 3.11, median = 2) and IAFs that only 
audit specific locations, products, or functions (mean = 3.82, median = 2.5) than for IAFs that do 
not coordinate at all with the external auditor, or coordinated only by meeting with the external 
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auditor (mean = 0.59, median = 0). This suggests that just meeting with the external auditor does 
not constitute the provision of any kind of assistance to the external auditor. TimeEA does not 
differ significantly by form of IAF contribution (DirectAssist or IndepWork). This could indicate 
that TimeEA encompasses both forms of IAF contribution.  Alternatively, it could indicate that 
DirectAssist and IndepWork are both measuring direct assistance. However, we argue that the 
former is more likely to be the case, given the wording of the questions. 
  To help validate IndepWork, we compared mean and median values for TimeF and 
Financial Focus across different contribution methods.  IAFs that spend more time auditing 
financial items and audit more activities related to financial reporting are more likely to perform 
work that will be useful to the external auditor. Consistent with this expectation, TimeF and 
Financial Focus are both significantly larger (p = 0.07, 0.004, one-tailed, respectively) for IAFs 
that only coordinate with the external auditor by performing audits of specific locations, 
products, and functions (IndepWork = 1 and DirectAssist = 0) than for IAFs that only loan staff 
to the EA (DirectAssist = 1 and IndepWork = 0).  
3.2.4 Control variables 
Extant research has identified several factors, in addition to the IAF, that likely affect 
audit delay including: industry, size, complexity, financial condition, losses, extraordinary items, 
restatements, auditor characteristics, qualified audit opinions, and material weaknesses (Ashton 
et al. 1987; Ashton et al. 1989; Bamber et al. 1993; Kinney and McDaniel 1993; Schwartz and 
Soo 1996; Leventis et al. 2005; and Ettredge et al. 2006). Control variable selection directly 
follows Ettredge et al.’s (2006) recent and comprehensive model of audit delay, with minor 
alterations.24 Consistent with prior studies, an indicator variable for financial service firms 
                                                
24 Ettredge et al. (2006) found that audit delay was significantly shorter for firms in the high technology sector. We 
do not control for high technology firms because there are only 25 such observations in the entire sample. Our 
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(Financial Ind) is included in the model.25 We also control for observations from the utility 
industry (Utility) because utilities are subject to significant regulation, which likely affects the 
objectives and responsibilities of the IAF. Moreover, 21 percent of sample observations come 
from utilities and inclusion of an indicator variable ensures that these observations do not bias 
the results. We control for the effects of size and complexity with the natural log of total assets 
(Size) and the number of different segments in which the firm operates (Segments). Return on 
assets (ROA) and leverage (Leverage) proxy for financial condition. Indicator variables are 
included to identify observations with negative earnings (Loss) and extraordinary items (Extra). 
Quarterly and yearend restatements pertaining to each firm-year observation were obtained by 
searching the Audit Analytics database for the years 2000-2008.  The indicator variable, 
Restatement, identifies firm-years observations for which quarterly or yearend earnings were 
restated. Following Ettredge et al. (2006), we include audit fees scaled by total assets (EA Fee) in 
the model to control for potential risk factors that are not addressed by other control variables. 
The indicator variable, NotBusy, equals one if the fiscal yearend falls between January 31 and 
December 1; and, zero otherwise; and, external auditor tenure (EA Tenure) controls for the 
external auditor’s experience with the client firm.  
We also control for audit committee effectiveness because firms with more effective 
audit committees potentially require less audit effort and may also tend to invest more in IAF 
quality. Following Prawitt et al. (2009) and Prawitt et al. (2011) audit committee effectiveness 
                                                                                                                                                       
model also does not directly control for auditor changes because there are only 25 auditor changes in the sample. 
Instead, auditor tenure (number of years the same auditor has audited the firm) is used to address differences in audit 
delay attributable a new external auditor’s learning curve. The model does not include controls for modified 
opinions or internal control deficiencies because only three firms received a modified opinion of any type and four 
firms disclosed internal control deficiencies under SOX 302. Excluding these seven observations from the analyses 
does materially affect the size or significance of the coefficients in tests of the hypotheses.   
 
25 Removing financial services firm from the sample does not materially affect the significance of the quality or 




(AC Effectiveness) is measured using a GAIN survey question that asks respondents which 
applicable Blue Ribbon Committee recommendations that have been implemented by the firm. 
According to Abbott et al. (2004, 70), the Blue Ribbon Committee recommendations “represent 
an organized set of best practices that are expected to result in more effective audit committee 
oversight of the financial reporting process.” 
Finally, we include variables to control for year and SOX 302’s implementation. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 1, 75 observations have fiscal yearends that predate SOX 302’s 
effective date, August 29, 2002. The indicator variable, Post302_02, identifies firms with fiscal 
yearends between August 29, 2002 and December 31, 2002, inclusive; and, Post302_03 
identifies firms with fiscal yearends between January 1, 2002 and November 14, 2004, inclusive.  
Observations within each of these time periods (pre-302, Post302_02, Post302_03) come from 
different firms; therefore, inclusion of these indicator variables controls for independence of 
observations from the same firm in tests that use the full sample. 
3.3 Determinants of IAF contribution 
H3 predicts that IAF contribution is determined by IAF quality, audit committee 
effectiveness, material misstatement risk, and the availability of external and internal audit 
resources. H3 is tested using the model specified in Equation 2. !"# !"(!"#!!"#$%&'($&"#!!)!!!"(!"#!!"#$%&'($&"#!!)  = γ0 + γ1 IA Quality + γ2 AC Effectiveness + γ3Restatement + γ4NotBusy + γ5Post302_02 +  
γ5Post302_03 + η1 FinInd + η2Utility + η3Size + 
η4Loss + η5Contract +ε 
 
( 2) 
All variables have been defined previously.  IAF Contribution is one of the three contribution 
measures discussed previously, IA Contribution, DirectAssist, or IndepWork. IA Quality 
measures IAF quality, AC Effectiveness measures audit committee effectiveness, and 
Restatement indicates whether quarterly or annual financial statements were subsequently 
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restated. The variable, NotBusy, proxies for the availability of external auditing resources, which 
is expected to be higher outside of the busy season. The variables Post 302_02 and Post 320_03 
proxy for the availability of internal auditing resources, which likely decreased with the 
implementation of SOX 302. H3d predicts that all three of these indicator variables will be 
negatively associated with IAF contribution.  
We control for industry (Financial and Utility), size (Size), financial condition (Loss), 
and the extent to which internal audit work is outsourced to third parties. Variation in industry 
standards and complexity may affect external auditors’ reliance decision. Similarly, loss controls 
for financial condition, which likely affects both risk and IAF availability. Outsourcing 
arrangements are potentially related to both the quality of the IAF and the extent to which 
external auditors rely on IAF work, thus we include a variable that addresses outsourcing, 
Outsource (Prawitt et al. 2012). Outsource is measured with a GAIN question that ask 
respondents to indicate the extent to which general audit and IT work is outsourced to third 
parties.  
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the full sample of 293 firm-years, and a 
subsample of 189 observations from the years 2000-2002. Mean (median) audit delay is 41.9 
(39) days, which is considerably smaller than the 50.3 days reported in Ettredge et al. (2006) for 
their 2003 sample of firms. This likely reflects the differences in size and profitability of the 
samples. In particular, our sample firms are larger and exhibit fewer losses than those in Ettredge 
et al.’s sample; audit delay tends to be shorter for larger firms and those reporting positive 
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earnings relative to smaller firms and those reporting losses (e.g., Ashton et al. 1989; Bamber et 
al. 1993; Ettredge et al. 2006).  
Table 4 provides Pearson correlation coefficients for the independent variables in the 
models. Correlations between investment in the IAF (IA Size) and Financial Ind (r = -0.438), 
Size (r = -0.653), and EA Fee (r = 0.635) are large and significant (p < 0.01). This inhibits are 
ability to isolate the effective IAF investment on audit delay. None of the correlations for the 
remaining measures of IAF quality or IAF contribution is large enough to confound the results. 
Contribution measures (DirectAssist, IndepWork) and availability measures that identify time 
periods (Post 302_02, and Post 302_03) are significantly correlated with each other by 
construction.  
4.2. Multivariate results 
4.2.1. Determinants of audit delay 
 Table 5 reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of audit delay on 
measures of IAF quality, IAF contribution to the financial statement audit, and a set of control 
variables. The first three models use the full sample of 293 firm-years. Adjusted r-squared values 
for all three models is approximately 0.21 and the F-statics are highly significant (p < 0.001).  
Consistent with H1, audit delay is negatively and significantly associated with the 
comprehensive quality measures (p < 0.01, one-tailed) in Models 1 and 3. The coefficient for IA 
Quality in Model 1 indicates that a one-unit increase in quality corresponds to a 7.0-day 
reduction in audit delay. Given that the standard deviation for IA Quality is 0.44, a one-standard 
deviation improvement in IAF quality is associated with an approximate 3.1-day reduction in 
audit delay. The size of this reduction is material as earnings announcement dates preceded audit 
completion dates by an average of 7.4 days for comparable firms during the sample period. A 
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one standard deviation improvement in IA Quality reduces this difference by almost 50 percent, 
and thus, lowers the likelihood that the earnings number disclosed in a PEA is incorrect. 
Model 2 suggests that the negative relation between the comprehensive quality measure 
and delay is driven by the individual quality components, Competence, Fieldwork Qual, and IA 
Size, which have significantly (p < 0.01 to p < 0.10, one-tailed) negative coefficients. These 
variables are measured on different scales; therefore, we express their impact on audit delay 
using standard deviations for ease of comparison. One-standard deviation increases in 
Competence, Fieldwork Qual, and IA Size correspond to audit delay reductions of 2.5, 2.2, and 
2.4 days, respectively. The coefficients on Objectivity and Financial Focus are not significant, 
although the negative sign for Objectivity is consistent with H1.   
Models 4-8 use a subsample of 189 observations that predate SOX 404’s implementation 
by at least 22 months. Model 6 uses backward stepwise estimation because several independent 
variables are not significant in Models 4 and 5 and the sample size is relatively small. The high 
removal criterion of 0.50 ensures that even variables with marginal explanatory power are not 
excluded from the model. Overall, the explanatory power of the models is greater (adjusted R-
square ranges from 0.24 to 0.26) in the subsample, and the significance levels and sizes of the 
coefficients for the quality measures are generally larger.26 A one-unit (one standard deviation) 
increase in IA Quality corresponds to an 8.9-day (3.9-day) reduction in audit delay for the 
subsample. One-standard deviation increases in the Competence and Fieldwork Qual correspond 
to audit delay reductions of 2.7 and 2.4 days, respectively. Also, the coefficient on Objectivity is 
negative and significant (p < 0.10, one-tailed) in Models 5 and 6, indicating that audit delay is 
3.7 days if the CAE reports to the audit committee rather than a chief officer within the firm. 
                                                
26 Seemingly unrelated estimation was used to compare the coefficients on the quality measures in Models 1 and 2 to 




Investment in the IAF, which is significant in the full sample, drops from significance in Model 
5, but is significant in the stepwise regression. Consistent with the full sample result, Financial 
Focus is not significant in the subsample.   
Our findings suggest that the quality of the IAF affects control risk, and that external 
auditors appropriately assess control risk and accordingly adjust the nature and extent of audit 
procedures in a manner consistent with the audit risk model. Prior tests of the audit risk model 
provide limited evidence of a negative relationship between control risk and auditor effort. Pre-
SOX studies found no relation between internal control reliance and audit effort, as measured by 
audit fees or hours (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Stein et al. 1994; Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; Felix 
et al., 2001). Conversely, Hogan and Wilkins (2008) used data from 2003-2004 and found that 
external auditors exerted more effort when they audited firms with weak ICFR, as measured by 
internal control deficiencies reported under SOX 302 of SOX. The consistency of our findings 
with those of Hogan and Wilkins supports their contention that external auditors became more 
sensitive to risk after the audit failures of the early 2000s (Hogan and Wilkins 2008, 222). Our 
results also have implications for practice because they suggest that managers can potentially 
improve reporting timeliness by raising the competence level of IAF staff, improving fieldwork 
quality, and making greater investments in the IAF. 
We H2 using all three contribution measures (IA Contribution, DirectAssist and 
IndepWork). As predicted, audit delays are approximately 4.7 days shorter (p < 0.05, one-tailed) 
in the full sample and 8.2 days shorter (p < 0.001, one-tailed) in the 2000-2002 subsample for 
firms with IAF’s that contribute to the financial statement audit compared with those that do not 
(Models 1 and 4). Results in Models 3 and 7 indicate that the relation between IAF contribution 
and audit delay varies with the method of contribution. Consistent with H2, audit delays are 
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approximately 4 days shorter (p < 0.05, one-tailed) in the full sample and 6.6 days shorter (p < 
0.001, one-tailed) in the subsample if the IAF contributes to the external audit by independently 
performing audit work. While the coefficients on DirectAssist are consistent with predictions, 
they are not significant. The nature of the internal-external auditor relationship provides a 
potential explanation as to why DirectAssist is not significantly associated with delay. When the 
IAF provides direct assistance, an internal auditor is performing work in place of an external 
audit staff member. In such cases, the external auditor must supervise the internal auditor, and 
IAF work is subject to more scrutiny and testing than work performed by external audit staffers. 
Consequently, substituting an internal auditor for an external auditor may not significantly 
reduce the time it takes to complete the audit. Another possible explanation is that much of the 
independent IAF work is performed throughout the year, rather than at yearend. Thus, reliance 
on this work prevents the external auditor from having to perform similar procedures at yearend, 
when resources are constrained. Conversely, the practice of loaning staff likely takes place when 
the external auditor is onsite at yearend performing the financial statement audit. A final reason 
the results for DirectAssist do not support H2 may arise from the sample. There are 24 
observations from IAFs that only loan staff to the external auditors; therefore, it is difficult to 
isolate the effects of IAF contribution arising from direct assistance from those arising from 
independently performed IAF work.  
As with the coordination measures, the size and significance levels of the contribution 
measures are larger in the subsample of observations from 2000-2002. Seemingly unrelated 
estimation (SUE) indicates that the absolute values of the coefficients for IA Contribution and 
IndepWork in the subsample (Models 4 and 7, respectively) are significantly (p = 0.021 and p = 
0.096, two-tailed) larger than the corresponding coefficients for the full sample (Models 1 and 3, 
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respectively). This result suggests that the SOX 404’s impending implementation reduced the 
extent to which internal-external auditor coordination affected audit delay, as both client and 
external audit firms adjusted work processes to meet the new regulation.  
The findings are relevant for research that examines the effect of the IAF’s contribution 
on audit fees and hours (Stein et al. 1994; Felix et al. 2001; Prawitt et al. 2011). The results are 
consistent with Felix et al. (2001), whose comprehensive contribution measure was negatively 
associate with audit fees; however, they differ from Prawlitt et al. (2011), who found that direct 
assistance was associated with a reduction in fees, while independently performed IAF work was 
not. The contrast in results potentially arises from differences in the choice of survey questions 
used to measure different forms of IAF contribution, as discussed in Section 3.2.3. It may also be 
attributable to differences between the underlying constructs that fees and delay measure. Audit 
fees reflect only external auditor effort, while delay reflects total audit effort (both internal and 
external). Thus, direct assistance may indeed reduce external audit fees, as relatively low-cost 
IAF hours are substituted for more expensive external auditor hours. However, as discussed 
previously, the substitution of internal auditor hours for external audit hours does not necessarily 
reduce the overall amount of external and internal audit time required to complete the audit.   
Results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior research. The 
coefficient for the financial industry indicator is negative, as expected, but not significant. Audit 
delay is significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed) longer for utilities in the full sample, potentially 
reflecting the complex regulatory requirements of this industry. Audit delay is also significantly 
longer for more highly leveraged firms (p < 0.05, two-tailed) and loss firms (p < 0.10, two-
tailed) in the full sample; however, as in Ettredge et al. (2004), ROA is not significantly 
associated with delay. As expected, external auditor tenure is significantly (p < 0.001, two-tailed) 
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and negatively associated with delay, reflecting the steep learning curve external auditors face 
with new clients. Consistent with the audit risk model, audit delay is significantly (p < 0.05, two-
tailed) shorter for firms with more effective audit committees in the full sample. The 
insignificant coefficients for Post302_02 suggest that the implementation of SOX 302 had little 
effect on audit delay. However, audit delays were significantly longer in the 22-month period 
immediately preceding the implementation of SOX 404 (January 1, 2003 to November 14, 2004) 
when compared with the pre-SOX 302 period.27 
As expected, audit fees are a highly significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed) determinant of audit 
delay across all models. The result that IAF quality and contribution are significant, even after 
controlling for audit fees, indicates that the effects of IAF contribution are not perfectly priced 
into audit fees. One potential explanation for this result is that a significant portion of the audit 
fee is set prior to the audit, with minimal adjustments made after the audit. Thus, differences 
between actual hours worked and budgeted hours that arise from IAF quality and contribution 
during the course of the audit are not perfectly reflected in the fee. However, such differences do 
appear to affect the number of days required to complete the audit.  
The homogeneity of sample firms and the time period of the sample potentially limit the 
generalizability of our results. However, we expect that the negative relations between audit 
delay and both IA quality and contribution would be even larger in a more heterogeneous sample 
drawn from a more stable time period. The sample consists of very large firms that have 
relatively sophisticated IAFs and exhibit relatively little variation in audit delay. Audit delay for 
                                                
27 The filing deadline for sample firms was reduced from 90 days to 75 days on December 15, 2003. Thus, 10 
observations from the Post302_03 time period (January 1, 2003 to November 15, 2004) were not subject to the 75-
day filing deadline. Removing these 10 observations from the sample or grouping observations by filing deadlines 
does not materially affect the results or conclusions. The finding that audit delay increased significantly even though 
filing deadlines were reduced by 15 days suggests that increases in yearend audit work in preparation for SOX 404 




this sample is an average of 5.7 days shorter than that reported for Bronson et al.’s (2011) sample 
of accelerated filers over the comparable time period. Given that the effects of IAF quality and 
contribution are material and significant even in this homogenous sample, we expect these 
effects would be even larger in a broader sample of firms exhibiting greater variation in size, IAF 
quality, contribution, and audit delay. Sample observations are drawn from the four-year period 
prior to SOX 404’s implementation. Clearly this was a period of great change for both internal 
and external auditors. However, again, if the analysis produced significant results during a period 
in flux, we expect the results would be even stronger in a more stable period. Consistent with 
this, results in Table 5 for the 2000-2002 subsample are more robust than results in the full 
sample. Moreover, the results indicate that IAF quality and contribution enabled the financial 
statement audit to be completed in less time during a period of relatively low attestation 
requirements (pre-SOX 404). The more rigorous attestation requirements of SOX 404 expanded 
the IAF’s potential to contribute to the financial reporting process (Gramling et al. 2004, 196), 
and therefore, if anything, should increase the impact of IAF quality and contribution on audit 
delay.  
4.2.2 Determinants of IAF contribution 
Table 6 reports the results of logistic regressions of IAF contribution measures on proxies 
for IAF quality, restatements, audit committee effectiveness, and the availability of external and 
internal audit resources. The first three models use the full sample of 293 firm-years; and, the last 
three use a subsample of 189 observations that predate SOX 404’s implementation by at least 22 
months. Explanatory power for all models ranges from 0.077 to 0.106; and, the chi-square 
statistics are significant (p < 0.05). IAF quality is positively and significantly (p < 0.01, one-
tailed) associated with contribution when it takes the form of independently performed audit 
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work, but negatively and significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed) associated with IAF contribution 
when it takes the form of direct assistance. This result suggests that higher quality internal 
auditors can independently perform work on which the external auditors can rely, while lower 
quality internal auditors can only assist in the financial statement audit when closely supervised 
by the external auditor. The results do not support H3b, which predicts a negative relation 
between restatements and contribution. Consistent with H3c, AC Effectiveness is positively and 
significantly (p < 0.01, one-tailed) associated with IA Contribution and IndepWork. AC 
Effectiveness is also positively associated with DirectAssist, but this association is not 
statistically significant (p = 0.105, one-tailed). Finally, the results show some support for 
predictions regarding external and internal auditor availability, but only when the IAF 
contributes to the financial statement by working independently. The negative and significant (p 
< 0.10, one-tailed) coefficients for NotBusy in the IA Contribution models indicate that external 
auditors are more likely to use work independently performed by the IAF for financial statement 
audits conducted during the busy season, when external auditing resources are constrained. 
Coefficients for Post302_302 are not significant; however, consistent with predictions, 
coefficients for Post 302_03 are negative and significant (p < 0.10, one-tailed) in the IndepWork 
regression. The results suggest that managers only began to significantly incorporate the IAF into 
assurance processes in preparation for SOX 404; therefore, IAF availability did not decline until 
just prior to SOX 404’s effective date. Overall, results in Table 6 suggest that the nature of the 
IAF’s contribution to the financial statement audit (direct assistance versus independent work) is 
quite important in identifying factors that influence contribution.  
The results extend those of Felix et al. (2001). Their comprehensive measure of IAF 
quality was positively and significantly associated with IAF quality, while our results suggest 
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that this relation holds only when contribution takes the form of independently performed IAF 
work. Results investigating resource availability are consistent with those of Felix et al. (2001), 
but they are of lower significance and only hold for independently performed IAF work. Felix et 
al. (2001) found that that inherent risk moderates that the positive relation between availability 
and contribution and the results for AC Effectiveness suggest that control risk also directly affects 
contribution.   
4.3. Extensions 
4.3.1. Robustness tests  
As in most cross-sectional studies, it is difficult to completely eliminate the possibility 
that the results have been confounded by endogeneity. Endogeneity may arise due to (1) 
correlated omitted variables (i.e., there may be one or more unobserved variables, such as 
accounting system quality, that are correlated with both internal audit quality and the time it 
takes to complete the external audit), and (2) simultaneity (i.e., internal audit quality and the 
audit completion date are simultaneously determined). We addressed the first concern in the 
models contained in Table 5 by including Restatements as a proxy for accounting system quality 
and AC Effectiveness to control for governance practices. Two alternative proxies for 
governance, the Gompers governance index and the extent of institutional ownership, were also 
included in un-tabulated robustness tests, but neither measure was significant. It is unlikely that 
simultaneity confounds the results because management and the audit committee are in charge of 
setting IAF quality and the external auditor controls audit delay. The external auditor is 
responsible for the nature and timing of audit procedures, and is legally liable if audit work does 
not support the audit opinion. Thus, the ability of managers and audit committee directors to 
directly influence the time it takes to compete the financial statement is limited. In un-tabulated 
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robustness tests, we addressed the potential effects of endogeneity using a two-stage-least 
squares (2SLS) model. Similar to Prawitt et al. (2009), IAF quality was modeled as a function of 
average quality for the industry, cash flow from operations, inventory, assets, external audit fees, 
audit committee effectiveness, and indicator variables designating different time periods. 
Industry quality, cash flows, and inventory served as instrumental variables, and the model 
predicting IAF quality was significant in both the full sample and subsample, with explanatory 
powers of 0.118 and 0.072, respectively. Delay was then regressed on the predicted value of IAF 
Quality obtained from the first stage regression, IA Contribution, and the control variables in 
Equation (1). In both samples, the predicted values for IAF quality were positive and significant 
(p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, one-tailed). All other variables in the model had materially similar 
coefficients and significance levels.   
An industry-adjusted measure of audit delay was also used in tests of H1 because prior 
research found that industry was a significant determinant of audit delay and our sample size 
constrains the number of control variables that can be included in the model. Accordingly, we 
also computed audit delay for each observation relative to all firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code. The direct of the coefficients for IA Quality and the contribution measures were consistent 
with predictions and significance levels were comparable the results in Table 5. 
4.3.2   Mediating effects of IAF contribution on quality 
Taken together, hypotheses H1, H2, and H3a propose that IAF quality has both direct and 
indirect effects on audit delay, as depicted in Figure 1. H1 posits that IAF quality directly 
reduces audit delay by reducing control risk. H3a and H2 predict that IAF quality is positively 
associated with the likelihood that external auditors use IAF work, which in turn, is negatively 
associated with the number of days required to complete the audit.  Results in Tables 5 and 6 that 
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use IndepWork to measure contribution are consistent with the premise. Accordingly, we use a 
path model with maximum likelihood estimation to calculate the indirect effect of IA Quality on 
Delay, via IndepWork (Table 7).28 The indirect effect is the product of the coefficient for IA 
Quality (0.191) in the model predicting IndepWork and the coefficient for IndepWork (-6.672) in 
the model predicting delay (Table 7). The indirect effect is significant, but relatively small (-
0.776, p < 0.05, one-tailed), and thus indicates that reductions in audit delay associated with 
higher levels of IAF quality are primarily driven by stronger ICFR. The indirect effect of IAF 
Quality on audit delay via IndepWork is also negative and significant in the 2000-2002 
subsample of firms (-1.009, p < 0.10, one-tailed), although complete results are not included in 
the tables.A natural extension of this study would be an investigation of whether the significant 
negative relations between contribution and delay are increasing in the quality of the IAF. 
Specifically, if audit delay is decreasing in IAF contribution, then a stronger IAF may produce 
greater reductions in audit delay relative to a weaker IAF. However, we are unable conduct this 
analysis because correlations between interaction terms (IA Quality*IA Contribution and IA 
Quality*IndepWork ) and the individual contribution measures (IA Contribution and IndepWork) 
are too large (r = 0.87 and 0.91) to obtain reliable coefficients. 
5. Conclusion  
This study examines the role that the internal audit function (IAF) plays in the timeliness 
of financial reporting by investigating whether measures of IAF quality and the IAF’s 
contribution to the financial statement audit are associated with audit delay. Results indicate that 
                                                
28 The coefficients from the logistic regression predicting the likelihood that IndepWork = 1 cannot be used to 
calculate the indirect effects (Table 6, Model 3). Maximum likelihood estimation produces coefficients that differ 
from the logistic regression in Table 6, but can be used to calculate indirect effects. Coefficients from the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) of the direct effect of IA Quality on Delay in Table 7 are identical to those in the OLS 
regression in Model 3 of Table 5. Standard error calculations for MLE differ slightly from those produced by OLS 




firms with higher quality IAFs experience significantly shorter audit delays: a one standard 
deviation increase in our comprehensive measure of IAF quality is associated with a 3.1-to-3.9-
day reduction in audit delay, depending on sample period. The negative relation between IAF 
quality and audit delay is primarily driven by the competence of internal audit staff and the 
quality of their fieldwork. IAF investment and objectivity are also negatively associated with 
audit delay, but significance levels are sensitive to sample period. Contrary to predictions, the 
degree to which the IAF audits financial activities is not significantly associated with delay. 
Audit delay is also significantly shorter (4.7 to 8.2 days, depending on sample period) when the 
external auditor uses IAF work to complete the audit. This reduction is largely attributable to 
independently performed IAF work, and not direct assistance. The magnitudes of the 
aforementioned reductions in audit delay are economically significant, given that accelerated 
filers released earnings an average of 7.4 days prior to the audit completion date during our 
sample period.  
This study also provides evidence on the determinants of internal audit contribution. IAF 
quality is significantly and positively (negatively) associated with contribution when it takes the 
form of independently performed audit work (direct assistance). This suggests that higher quality 
internal auditors can independently perform work for use in the financial statement audit, while 
lower quality internal auditors can only assist in the audit when closely supervised by the 
external auditor. Audit committee effectiveness, is positively and significantly associated with 
both methods of contribution, consistent with the expectation that effective audit committees 
lower control risk. As predicted, the likelihood that external auditor use is increasing 
(decreasing) in our proxies for internal (external) auditor availability, suggesting that resource 
availability affects the contribution decision. 
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As the first study to provide empirical evidence that both IAF quality and the IAF’s 
contribution to the financial statement audit affect audit delay, this research makes several 
contributions to the literature. In particular, we extend studies that investigate determinants of 
audit delay, and thereby identify factors associated with the timeliness, and potentially the 
quality, of accounting information. The use of audit delay to measure audit effort compliments 
prior studies that use audit fees and hours to investigate the relation between IAF contribution 
and audit effort (Stein et al. 1994; Felix et al. 2001 and Prawitt et al. 2011). The results suggest 
that the nature of the IAF’s contribution to the financial statement audit (independent work 
versus direct) is an important factor in understanding how IAF contribution influences the 
financial statement audit and in external auditors’ decisions to use the work of the IAF. Finally, 
this research builds upon prior work that uses the GAIN database to further our understanding of 
the IAF’s role throughout the financial reporting process (Prawitt et al. 2009, Lin et al. 2011, 
Prawitt et al. 2011). 
The findings have important implications for managers and audit committee directors 
who structure the IAF, and for both managers/directors and external auditors who together 
determine the extent of the IAF’s contribution to the financial statement audit. The results show 
mixed support for recent PCAOB guidance contending that external auditors can improve audit 
efficiency by making more extensive use of work performed by others, and thus indicate a need 
for more research that investigates the nature of the IAF’s contribution (PCAOB 2005, 2007a, 
2007b). In particular, studies could better distinguish between the different methods by which 
internal audit work contributes to the completion of the financial statement audit. Finally, this 
research should be of interest to regulators who set reporting deadlines. 
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This study is subject to several limitations. Most notably, the small size and homogeneity 
of our sample, combined with the large number of control variables, lowers the power of our 
statistical tests. In particular, models predicting IAF contribution have low explanatory power. 
Furthermore, large firms with relatively sophisticated IAFs and relatively little variation in audit 
delay tend to participate in the GAIN survey. While this limits our ability to generalize findings 
to firms that did not respond to the GAIN survey, we expect that the material negative relations 
between audit delay and both IA quality and contribution found in the current sample would be 
even larger in a more heterogeneous sample. Relatedly, few IAFs in the sample only contribute 
to the financial statement audit by providing direct assistance to the external auditor; therefore, it 
is difficult to isolate the effects of direct assistance from those of independently performed work. 
Another concern with this study is the pre-SOX 404 sample period, which was a time of 
significant change for both internal and external auditors. However, given that the analyses 
produced significant results even during this transitional period, we expect the results would be 
even stronger for a more stable period. Additionally, the rigorous attestation requirements of 
SOX 404 expanded the IAF’s potential to contribute to the financial reporting process (Gramling 
et al. 2004 p. 196), and therefore, if anything, should increase the impact of IAF quality and 
contribution on audit delay in the post-SOX 404 period. Finally, it is possible that our results are 
confounded by endogeneity. While it is difficult to completely eliminate this concern, inclusion 
of controls for accounting system reliability and governance practices and results from a two-
stage-lease-squares regression indicate that endogeneity is not likely to be a significant problem. 
Despite these limitations, this study provides new evidence on the IAF’s role in the financial 
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Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items Used to Construct Competence, Fieldwork Qual, and 
Financial Focus 
 
Survey items used to construct Competence 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Experience 8.69 8.00 4.03 0.00 24.00 
Education 4.49 4.50 0.46 3.00 6.00 
Certification 0.58 0.59 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Training 56.06 50.00 27.87 0.00 178.00 
Experience: Average number of years of auditing experience (internal and external) of the audit staff 
(B6a and B6b). 
Education: Average of the number of years of undergraduate and graduate education of the audit staff, 
based on highest degree achieved. Associate, Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D. degrees are assumed to take 
2, 4, 6, and 8 years of study, respectively (B5). 
Certifications: Percentage of professional staff members with one or more audit certifications (B8). 
Training: Annual hours of training per internal auditor (B15b). 
 
Survey items used to construct Fieldwork Qual 
Quality assurance  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Direct Supervision 1.76 2.00 0.49 0.00 2.00 
Working paper review 1.48 2.00 0.72 0.00 2.00 
Audit client feedback 1.65 2.00 0.63 0.00 2.00 
Peer review 0.99 1.00 0.77 0.00 2.00 
Follow Up 1.64 2.00 0.77 0.00 2.00 
Grading 0.94 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 
Quality assurance:  How frequently do you employ the following quality assurance techniques during 
fieldwork?  (Regularly = 2, Occasionally = 1, Never = 0)  
Follow Up: Do you formally follow-up to test corrective action? (Yes = 2, No = 0)  
Grading: Does the final audit report include a “grade” or “score” as determined by the results of the audit? 
(Yes/Generally yes, but moving away from this practice = 2; No/generally no, but starting to 
implement this practice = 0)  
Survey items used to construct Financial Focus 
How frequently were the following types of activities audited? (Regularly = 2, Occas. = 1, Never = 0) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Adequacy of internal accounting controls 1.88 2.00 0.36 0.00 2.00 
Accuracy, reliability & completeness of financial 
records 1.60 2.00 0.55 0.00 2.00 
Impact of changes in accting. Rules or 
regulations 0.80 1.00 0.68 0.00 2.00 
Interim quarterly financial results reported 
externally 0.52 0.00 0.75 0.00 2.00 




Coding of IAF Contribution Measures 
 




Perform complete or partial audits of 




No Yes Total 
DirectAssist 
Loan staff to 
External Auditors 
No 101  107 208 
Yes 23 62 85 
 
Total 124 169 293 
Yes (N = 267) No 
(N = 26) 
IA Coordinate = 0 
IF your answer was yes, then what means were used? (check all that apply) 
 
1) Loan staff to External Auditors (N = 83)  
2) Perform complete or partial audits of specific Locations, Products, or 
Functions (N = 165) 
 
3) Conduct joint annual Planning sessions (N = 183) 
4) Conduct joint Risk or Control Sessions (N = 117) 
Did you coordinate your audit services with the external auditors? 
3) and/or 4) ONLY   (N = 75) 
IA Coordinate = 0 
1) and/or 2)  (N = 192) 
IA Coordinate = 1 
